Changes in the relative share of different age groups in the population may present inflationary, disinflationary or even deflationary tendencies. We find evidence that increases in the share of the very old (age 80 and older) may be associated with deflation. The analysis is based on an international dataset over a long time period. Classifying age groups into young, working, younger old and older old, we find that the shares of the young and the younger old groups are inflationary, while those of the working group disinflationary, and those of the very old group seemingly deflationary. JEL Classification: E31, E37, J11, J14.
INTRODUCTION
In many countries, the population is aging. Actuaries are aware of the financial impact that increasing old-age dependency ratios will have for PayGo pension schemes and other unfunded social support systems, such as health and long-term care. But what impact will a changing demographic structure have, if any, on economic factors such as inflation? This question is also of vital importance to actuaries who use demographic and economic projections in the pricing and valuation of products, design of risk management solutions, and in opinions regarding the sustainability of social programs. Many actuarial products are priced and valued using nominal interest rates. The profitability of such products is directly affected by the level of inflation.
Actuarial present values of future income streams are lower the higher the inflation rate used for valuation. Should our models account for any association between ageing and the level of inflation? This paper examines the above question using an international dataset, to offer insights that may be of use to practicing actuaries.
The world population has experienced a drastic shift in terms of both size and composition in the past few decades. Currently, several aging countries are also experiencing historically low inflation and, in some instances, even deflation. Given the projected global aging, it is important to understand the link between the two (if it exists), since it may have significant implications for actuarial practice. In three panels in Figure 2 , we plot the cumulative inflation against the change in the proportion of the population of Young 0-19, Working Age 20-64, and the Old 65+, respectively, over the period 1955 -2010 for our sample of 22 countries. These plots suggest that countries with a smaller decrease in the share of the Young experienced lower inflation while those with a greater increase in the share of the Working Age experienced higher inflation. On the other hand, the association with the Old is unclear. Without controlling for other factors, this is contrary to recent findings that higher shares of working age population are associated with lower inflation.
This suggests that the question of association is worth studying further. 7 1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 and Old (65 years and over). We plot this change against the cumulative inflation over the same period in each of the countries, presenting one scatter plot for each age group. Note the horizontal axis scales are different.
With respect to the relation between the Old group and inflation, recent studies by Yoon et al. (2014) and Juselius and Takáts (2015 , 2016a , 2016b arrive at opposing conclusions although they use similar datasets in their studies. In particular, while Yoon et al. predict that an increase in the share of the older age groups relative to those under 15 years old will potentially introduce deflationary pressures on the economy, Juselius and Takáts find that the older age group exerts inflationary pressures. 5 We hypothesize that to reconcile these two opposing findings, a finer decomposition of the older age group will be required.
We present analyses using both, an age grouping similar to that used in the literature, and one in which the older ages are separated into two groups. A typical time trend of inflation among the OECD countries is that it rose in the late 1960s and after peaking in the late 1970s it gradually declined and stayed relatively low in the 1990s and thereafter. To avoid conflating the possibly independent trends in demography and inflation, we also analyze the relationship over two sub-periods, 1955 -1979 and 1980 -2010 . Juselius and Takáts (2015 introduced a polynomial specification for the relationship between population age share and inflation, reporting a large variation of specifications and tests based on this structure. We first implemented the apparently most robust version of their regression model, with a fourth degree polynomial in demographics, fixed effects, and various controls as regressors. We do this for the total period and the two sub-periods 1955-79 and 1980-2010. 6 We find that older ages have a disinflationary or deflationary association. However, Juselius and Takáts (2015 , 2016a , 2016b did not elaborate on somewhat similar findings in their paper, instead they focussed on the U-shape of the "pre-tail" portion of their polynomial estimates.
We believe that the tail is in fact important and significant, and may perhaps offer an opportunity to reconcile conflicting findings. To show this, we extended the number of age groupings in our second investigation. Using OECD data for a shorter sub-period, 1990-2010, we made use of a finer breakdown of the old age group available for this period. We found that the relationship at older ages is strongly deflationary for this latter period, but not so for the younger old. This is also consistent with the findings of studies on Japanese data (see Anderson et al., 2014; Muto et al., 2012; Shirakawa, 2012) . Our findings also remain qualitatively the same when we estimate panel regressions for the entire sample period of 56 years and the two major subperiods, this time separating the older age groups into younger old (65-74 years) and older old (75+).
The above analyses do not provide evidence of causation, but rather of association, which is the goal of this paper. However, as a complementary analysis, we estimated a reduced-form panel-data Vector Autoregression (VAR) model to capture dynamic interactions among some key macroeconomic variables and shares of age groups. Our aim was to determine how much of the variation in inflation can be explained by the evolution of the demographic structure, when allowance is made for interactions among these other key macroeconomic variables. We found that the changing age profile across selected countries does have an economically and statistically significant impact on inflation, after controlling for oil prices. However, the short period of appropriate data availability for this exercise means that we again observe a life-cycle pattern; i.e., dependent cohorts in general have an inflationary impact. Our conclusion is that only more advanced aging shows a deflationary association, thereby explaining some of the contradictions in the literature.
The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a selected review of literature. In Sections 3 and 4, we provide two investigations, including analyses on the OECD panel over different sub-periods, and on the OECD panel with more age groupings in the older tail. In Section 5, we provide analysis using the reduced form panel-data VAR to provide a form of robustness check on our analysis. Section 6 concludes
RELATED LITERATURE
There is considerable literature regarding the effects of demography, in particular the age structure of the population, on economic growth, and other leading macroeconomic variables. In particular, the link between age structure and growth has been widely studied in recent times.
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Evidence of the economic significance of the impact of the age structure on the economy has not been clear cut. On the one hand, theoretical macroeconomic models, which are typically calibrated on the age profile of savings, have highlighted the importance of demographic structure, as have many commentaries on economic policy. On the other hand, the econometric evidence assembled has been seen to be less compelling. There are a number of reasons for this.
In particular, most of the changes in demographic structure have occurred at low frequencies. This renders it difficult to distinguish the impact of demographic structure from the other low frequency trends that typically dominate economic time series. In addition, the vector of proportions in each age group is also inevitably highly collinear, making precise estimation of the effect of each age group a difficult, if not impossible, task. Faced with these difficulties, it has become a common practice in this literature simply to impose strong restrictions on the effect of the demographic structure, for instance, through the use of a single proxy, known as the dependency ratio. However, the balance of the evidence suggests that one cannot rule out the risk that an older age structure has a negative impact on economic growth. Given this evidence, it is reasonable to expect that an economy with an aging population, when accompanied by high debt and low employment, may give rise to an environment that has a tendency to have low inflation or even deflation.
Japan has the most rapidly aging population in the world and experienced persistent deflation over the past two decades. Various channels through which demographic changes affect inflation in Japan have been examined in the past few years. Using a deterministic lifecycle economic model with capital, Bullard et al. (2012) find that the optimal inflation rates suggest that aging population structures like those in Japan may contribute to observed low rates of inflation or even deflation. Katagiri (2012) investigates the effects of changes in demand structure caused by population aging on the Japanese economy using a multi-sector Keynesian model with job creation/destruction. He finds that such demand shocks caused around 0.3 percentage point deflationary pressure on year-to-year inflation from the early 1990s to the 2000s in Japan. Katagiri (2012) shows that the repetition of such upward revisions made those effects look more persistent.
Based on simulation of a calibrated IMF Global Integrated Fiscal and Monetary (GIMF) model, Anderson et al. (2014) find that substantial deflationary pressures arise from population aging, mainly from declining growth and falling land prices. In addition, the repatriation of foreign assets by the elderly leads to real exchange rate appreciation, which exerts a downward pressure on inflation because of increased demand for relatively cheaper foreign goods and services 8 . By embedding the fiscal theory of the price level 9 into an OLG model, Katagiri et al. (2014) find that the effects of aging critically depend on its causes. Aging is deflationary when caused by an increase in longevity but inflationary when caused by a decline in birth rate. In the 8 There is a considerable increase in the proportion of imported foreign goods in domestic consumption in Japan over the last decade. According to World Bank national account data, this ratio was 9.8% in 2001 and continuously increased to 19.0% in 2013. 9 Fiscal theory of the price level states that the government will reduce the impact of its (debt) obligations of an unsustainable policy through inflation.
case of Japan, they believe that it is unexpected longevity, not simply aging, that has induced a deflationary pressure. In addition, Societe Generale (2016) provides an overview for consequences of aging for price dynamics. It argues that the graying of the population could potentially influence price dynamics through a wide-ranging set of key macroeconomic variables and therefore it is hard to tell from the purely theoretical perspective how changes in demographics will ultimately shape the inflation rate behavior.
Our paper is focused on the empirical aspects of the relationship between population aging and inflation. In recent studies, Juselius and Takáts (2015 , 2016a , 2016b and Yoon et al. (2014) have estimated the effect of demographic changes on inflation using post-war panel data of developed countries. However, they reached opposing conclusions.
On the one hand, using a panel dataset covering 30 OECD economies for the period of 1960-2013, Yoon et al. (2014) find that population growth is inflationary, while aging is potentially deflationary. On the other hand, looking at a similar panel of 22 OECD countries from 1955 -2010, Juselius and Takáts (2015 , 2016a , 2016b find that aging is inflationary rather than deflationary. That is, a larger share of dependents (both young and old) is correlated with higher inflation, whereas having more working population leads to lower inflation. Both papers extend their arguments based on the relative speed of adjustment of aggregate supply and aggregate demand to provide some intuition for their findings.
To compare the two papers, we identify a panel regression in each paper that can be directly compared with its counterpart in the other paper. Juselius and Takáts (2015) are as follows:
where , , and are the shares of young, working age and old, respectively. is a constant and is the country-specific fixed effect. Note that there is no constant in Equation [2] because the three population shares sum to unity. The difference between them lies in their treatment of trend inflation: while one uses a quadratic filter to remove the trend, the other incorporates time fixed effects in the model. Overall, the net effect of the old age group on inflation according to Yoon et al. (2014) is estimated as , but the statistical significance of this net effect is not reported in their paper. In both papers, the coefficient on the share of the working age group is also found to be negative, although it is statistically significant only in the study by Juselius and Takáts (2015) . Their findings agree on the inflationary tendency of the young (dependents) group. In the rest of the paper, we conduct analyses that help show the importance of incorporating distinct groups for older ages in the dataset.
ANALYSIS OF OECD DATA FOR VARIOUS TIME PERIODS
In this section, following Juselius and Takáts (2015) , we examine the relationship between inflation and demographic structure for various time periods using panel analysis. The full panel covers the period of 1955 -2010, but we also examine the relationship for shorter sub-periods.
In terms of country coverage, we use 22 OECD countries for which good quality data are available: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The annual inflation rate is obtained from OECD, World Bank Indicators and national data. We denote the inflation rate as . We index country by where, , and year by where, . The demographic data was obtained from the United Nations (2012) . In this analysis, we use finer demographic proportions: the total population (0 -80+) is divided into 17 five-year age groups (denoted by where ). The corresponding share of group in a country's total population is given by .
In addition to inflation rate and age structure variables, we use the following control variables. First, the real interest rate r , is used to roughly proxy the monetary policy. We define the ex-post real interest rate as the difference between the average nominal overnight rate and the inflation rate during the same year. We collect and compile nominal interest data from various sources, including OECD, IMF's World Economic Outlook (WEO) and national data. Second, the inflation rate may also be affected by the output gap, as suggested by standard monetary models. To compute the output gap , we use the deviation in real GDP from a HodrickPrescott filtered trend (with set to 100, the standard value for yearly frequency). Finally, data of real GDP is obtained from OECD and WEO.
The panel-regression model is written as [3] where is a constant, and are the country-specific and time fixed effects, respectively.
are the fourth order population polynomials 10 , which are used to overcome the estimation problems associated with direct use of age groups. Once estimates of the have been obtained, the corresponding coefficients on age groups can be directly computed.
We examine the age patterns on inflation for the OECD panel with various sub-periods, including those years before and after 1980. Results are reported in Table 1 . The first column
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See Fair and Dominguez (1991) , Higgins (1998) , and Arnott and Chaves (2011) The last column lists the estimates for the model with more refined age groups over the period of 1990-2010 (discussed below in Section 4). Note: We report the results of panel regressions of inflation on an age polynomial and control variables controlling for country fixed effects and time fixed effects (not included here for ease of reading). The dataset represents annual observations for a panel of 22 OECD countries. The final column uses data for a shorter period, but with a finer distribution of population age shares in the older age groups. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. Compared with the full period benchmark model (the dotted line), the effects in the two sub-periods appear more pronounced, but they follow roughly the same pattern.
In addition, in each regression, the real interest rate has a significant negative effect, while the output gap also affects inflation. These support the suggestion in Juselius and Takáts (2015) to include these variables as regressors.
ANALYSIS OF THE VERY OLD
From observing the relationship between the age patterns and inflation, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the "younger old" may be inflationary but the "older old" are deflationary.
Since the U.N. population table does provide more refined demographic data for "older old" It is important to recognise that period 1990-2010 was characterized by low and declining inflation, so although we include time fixed effects in the regression, the estimates over this period should be interpreted with caution. A referee has suggested that we seek more evidence of our hypothesis by conducting a further sub-period analysis, by breaking the sample into a higher inflation period ) and a declining inflation period . To this end, we estimate further panel regressions of inflation on demographic structure, this time using shares of age groups as regressors. However, we break the older age group into two parts. The model specifications are as follows. [4] where ( ) are the shares of age groups in total population for the young (0-19), the working age (20-64), the younger old (65-74) and the very old (75+) respectively. The estimation results are presented in Table 2 . For both periods, the share of the young old is associated with positive coefficients, although they are statistically significant in only two out of four cases. The coefficient on the share of the very old is significant and negative in all four regressions. In the sub-period , controlling for the real interest rate and the output gap leads to a drop in the size of the estimate but it retains its significance. The estimate is still much larger than that in the sub-period 1980-2010. While controlling for conditions through the real interest rate and the output gap would plausibly reduce the size of the estimate in the first sub-period, the difference between the two sub-periods requires some consideration. One possible explanation for this difference is that both the level and variability of inflation were much higher in the first sub-period than the second. This is especially plausible because the regressions also include time fixed effects to control for factors such as the change in the relative size of the older age groups over time.
Overall, we can see that the inclusion of the older age group helps in clarifying the association between age and inflation.
VECTOR AUTOREGRESSIVE MODEL AND SUMMARY OF MAIN RESULTS
We carry out additional work to incorporate dynamics in our analysis using a VAR model. While VAR is a more robust approach to use since it is model free, changes in data definitions affect the ability to model the cross-country panel time series in this way. After reviewing changes in methods in compiling the OECD data, there is only a relatively short period of data that we could use. Since we are investigating the long term impact of demographics, which may have low frequency impacts, the short period of consistent data is a limitation for this methodology. Hence, we use the results obtained from the VAR analysis mainly as a robustness check on our previous analysis.
The approach undertaken in this section has three important characteristics. First, we consider one year period and adopt a panel time-series approach to estimation of our VAR models. Second, we allow for interaction effects among a number of leading macroeconomic variables by estimating a VAR model instead of an individual equation. Third, we make no assumptions about the underlying economic processes and hence impose a minimal structure on the data.
Data and econometric model
The We index country by where, , and year by where, . In the empirical analysis, we are faced with two challenging problems. First we have at our disposal a relatively small number of time-series observations at the annual frequency. Second for each country, we also have a large number of macroeconomic control variables which are low frequency and, hence, likely to be highly co-linear. Both factors can contribute to low precision of the parameter estimates of the panel-data VAR regressions. As a result, we decide on relatively coarse demographic proportions by ten-year age bands. Denote the share of age group (0 -9, 10-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, 70+) in total population by and suppose the effect on the variable of interest, say , takes the form: [5] As , there is perfect collinearity among the demographic proportions if all the demographic shares are included. To deal with this, we restrict the coefficients to sum to 0, use as explanatory variables and recover the coefficient of the oldest age group from . We denote the 7 ( ) elements' vector of as .
The six endogenous variables of the system are:
1. the growth rate of the real GDP, ;
2. the share of investment in GDP, ;
3. the share of personal savings in GDP, ;
4. the logarithm of hours worked 11 , ;
5. the nominal short interest rate, ; and 6. the rate of inflation, .
We denote the vector of these six variables as . The exogenous variables are: and two lags of the logarithm of the real oil price. 12 We allow for intercept heterogeneity through but assume slope homogeneity and estimate a one-way fixed-effect augmented-panel VAR (2) of the form 13 : [6] plus two lags of the oil price. In Equation [6] , is the matrix of coefficients of the demographic variables. The long-run moving equilibrium for the system is then given by: [7] where captures the effect of the demographic variables. This reflects both the direct effect of demographics on each variable and the feedback between the endogenous variables. This allows, for instance, the effects of demography on savings to influence growth through the effect of savings on growth.
We can isolate the long-run contribution of demography to each variable in each country by: [8] This is the demographic attractor for the economic variables at any given time. In this analysis, we will examine the movements of elements of this vector, , over time, to indicate the contribution of demographics to the evolution of a particular variable in a particular country.
Results of Panel-data VAR regressions
We examine both the short and long term impacts. By exploring the D matrix of short term demographic impacts on the six endogenous variables, we find that the individual coefficients are not very well determined due to high collinearity among the variables in the VAR 13 We use a VAR (2) specification primarily to allow for more flexible dynamics and to deal with potential nonstationarity. Moreover, working with a VAR (2) specification (instead of VAR (1) specification) reduces the potential of spurious regression although we believe that spurious regression is less of a problem in the panel data setting, in particular when the cross-section dimension is large relatively to the dimension of time series.
specification. However, the hypothesis that the coefficients of the demographic variables are jointly not significantly different from zero is strongly rejected for all equations except hours worked (see Table 4 and Table 5 ). Note: 1. The row for Pr reports the joint significance of the 7 demographic variables in the equation. 2. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. Note: 1. The row forPr reports the joint significance of the 7 demographic variables in the equation. 2. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Note that the estimate of the coefficient (age group 60-69) on growth rate y is not significantly negative, and that on the oldest age group ( ) is negative at -0.455, although it is not statistically significant. That is, an increase in the share of old age group (70+) appears to induce a negative impact on economic growth rate. This is consistent with the conclusion given in Bloom et al. (2010) , which analyses the implications of population aging for economic growth. They argue that for OECD countries, projected aging population causes drops in both labor force participation and labor-force-to-population ratios and therefore suggests modest declines in the pace of economic growth.
In theory, we would expect that the demographic structure has significant impacts on hours worked. That it does not in our empirical results may indicate that there are likely to be offsetting adjustments in the labor force participation rates. Generally the results are plausible, although there are some unexpected results. For instance there is a negative effect of the 30-39 age group on growth and a positive effect of teenagers on savings and of the 60-69 years group on investment. Table 6 gives the matrix. By comparison, we note that by allowing for rich dynamics and interactions among the macroeconomic variables, the long-run effects are found to be much larger. In particular, we notice that the effect on hours is markedly more pronounced in our empirical results, perhaps due to this variable being highly persistent over time. The VAR analysis supports the U-shape hypothesis found in Juselius and Takáts (2015 , 2016a , 2016b and in our results. However, the lack of statistical significance of parameters again supports the motivation of our analysis in including older age groups to clarify the relation between demographic structure and inflation. The VAR analysis also enables us to perform further country-specific analysis. We consider how the results obtained in our study may shed some light on the question of whether the baby boomers squandered the demographic dividend. For this purpose, we conduct a counterfactual analysis. Table 7 shows, for the countries with available data, the impact on the six variables of the change in demographic structure between 1970 when the baby boomers were participating in the labor market, and 2010, when they were approaching retirement. 14 This is calculated using Equation [7] and the long-run estimates from the one way fixed effect model (Equation [6] ).
14 Note that only for the purpose of conducting a counterfactual exercise do we include observations starting from 1970 in our empirical analysis. In all other analysis, the estimation starts from 1999. This is because our experiment suggests that the panel-data VAR regressions exhibit major structural instabilities when the earlier samples from 1970 to 1998 are included in the estimation, producing highly biased estimates of the parameters. Note: This was calculated by applying the estimated long-run demographic coefficients to the demographic structure in each country as it was in 1970 and in 2010, and subtracting the result of the former from the latter. Updated April 20, 2015 to include Germany based on same parameter estimates as used for other countries.
The estimated impact of demographic changes on inflation varies across countries. We find that the estimated impact of demographic changes on both the interest rate and inflation is strongly negative and of quite similar orders of magnitude, consistent with real interest rate effects. Since the 1970s was the decade when the baby boomers entered the labor force strongly, we might have expected the supply-side effect to be deflationary, the arrival of such a large cohort depressing wages, but the demand-side effects might have been inflationary. Although both interest rates and inflation are expected to be higher around 1970 than in2010, the change over the period is not expected to be as large as predicted by demographic factors. However, caution regarding the actual, as opposed to the relative, magnitude is warranted, because the twoway fixed-effects estimates suggest that the demographic effects on these two variables might be overstated.
We further tested the robustness of our results with respect to the selected countries by re-estimating the specification in the panel-data VAR (2) regression on a dataset with each country excluded in turn. We obtain results that are relatively stable with respect to these exclusions, as are the tests as to whether the demographic variables are significant in each equation.
We also performed a number of other robustness checks with respect to the matrix of correlations between residuals, the presence of trends in the data, and removal of time effects.
The results of these checks were all satisfactory. They are not reported here for the sake of brevity, but are available on request.
The panel VAR analysis had several limitations. Firstly, the short period of data necessitated analysis at the annual frequency, though it would be reasonable to assume that demography affects the economy in more subtle ways over longer periods of time. Secondly, both age structure and inflation exhibit long memory and there is a risk of detecting spurious relationships if the possibility of co-integration is not properly tested. Thirdly, estimation of the coefficients of low frequency and highly collinear determinants is highly sensitive to the specification of the model and the estimation method used. Lastly, although the proportions in each age group are plausibly exogenous, the other leading macroeconomic variables in the system are likely to be responding to the low frequency demographic impacts. This endogeneity has the effect of reducing the marginal contribution of the demographic variables to the overall performance of the economy.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyze OECD panel data over the full period and sub-periods to investigate the impact of population aging on inflation. Our analysis suggests that it is the sub-period, rather than the panel sample, that shapes the pattern of the impact of aging on inflation. In addition, we believe that, as supported by the study on OECD data after 1990, a finer adjustment to age categories is needed to capture the potentially different effects of the older and younger of the 65+ age group. That is, for the old population, the older the age, the more deflationary the cohort is. This finding suggests that studies on the old should use a greater number of age groups. This is particularly important because the size and the length of this age group is increasing due to increasing longevity.
As for the OECD panel analysis, the challenge of determining the link between aging and inflation is that demographic changes exert (according to theory) opposing forces on price levels.
Keeping population size constant, aging causes reduced expectations of growth and consumption (deflationary), while also reducing the resources available for production. This latter effect can take place directly or through structural transformation, which are both inflationary. An empirical examination of the relationship suffers from the danger of failing to control for other more salient factors that affect inflation. Moreover, the data appears to be a source of another problem -there is very little evidence of deflationary episodes in our sample period, making it difficult to analyze the prospects for deflation as opposed to disinflation, or inflation falling to low levels.
Given the limitations in getting a long period of consistently maintained data, we use a cross-country panel VAR model as a type of robustness check on our analysis. Several key variables were modelled jointly to be able to identify the effect of the age distribution on inflation. Our results indicate that the age profile of the population can have both an economically and a statistically significant impact on output growth, investment, savings, hours worked, interest rates and inflation. However, the panel VAR analysis suggests that the older age group is slightly inflationary. This result may be caused by coarse demographic groups and short period studied. Based on robustness checks conducted on the VAR analysis we believe that using such a model should provide more accurate predictions for growth and inflation over the long term horizon.
In conclusion, this paper demonstrates that demographic structure does affect economic factors such as inflation. However, the measurement and quantification of this impact remain challenging problems worthy of further research. This effect has significant implications for actuaries who make and rely on projections of demographic and economic effects in their work because demographic and economic assumptions are often set independently. The actuarial profession should stay informed regarding developing research in this area.
